Opinions
Raúl and the New Cuba
Americans could see gradual change in Cuba after Fidel Castro’s departure, but only if the embargo ends.

Cuba’s President Fidel Castro gestures as he addresses a crowd of Latin American students gathered in Pedernales, in Holguin province. (AP Photo/Javier Galeano)
Fidel Castro’s resignation as Cuba’s president after nearly 50 years at the helm has sparked a debate about the future of the island nation. Castro’s resignation may provide an opening for Cuban democracy – but not for a while. And if the United States does not reform its Cuba policies, the process of democratization will take even longer. So, is this the beginning of a new era in Cuban politics, as former executive director of the Cuban American National Foundation Joe Garcia suggested recently? Or does Fidel’s departure leave Cuba unchanged, as the Washington Post editorialized? Paradoxically, Castro’s resignation could signify both.
In the short term, no one should expect any significant change to take place in Cuba. Raúl Castro, Fidel’s younger, more pragmatic brother and the country’s interim president, will – at best – continue to promote some economic liberalization but will maintain one-party rule. Having studied the Chinese economic model of state-led capitalism since 1997, Raúl encouraged more foreign investment and has built up the island’s tourism industry. In the realm of foreign policy, he has shown a greater willingness to improve relations with the United States, repeatedly offering to discuss disagreements at the negotiating table so long as the United States treats Cuba as an equal. Nevertheless, Raúl’s political reforms – while welcome – have been limited to improving the government bureaucracy’s efficiency. While he has been willing to delegate more authority to underlings than Fidel ever did, Raúl has shown no desire to diffuse political power outside the ruling Communist Party of Cuba (CPC).
If Raúl Castro decides to step down from the presidency and govern from behind the scenes, there is still little chance of dramatic change. For one thing, Raúl would still be the de facto, if not nominal, leader of Cuba because he would continue to control and have the loyalty of the military and the security and intelligence services. He would continue to be a key figure in the CPC. Other top contenders for the presidency, such as Vice President Carlos Lage Davila, are personally loyal to the Castro brothers (although Lage is also known as a pragmatic technocrat who is Cuba’s primary economic fixer). Felipe Perez Roque, the powerful foreign minister who is seen as a potential future vice-president or even president, served as Fidel Castro’s chief of staff for eight years and loyally subscribes to his mentor’s policies. In fact, Perez Roque is grouped with hard-liners jokingly referred to as the “Tropical Taliban” due to their ideological zeal.
While Cuba’s leadership offers little hope for either economic or political liberalization in the short term, the resignation of Castro does provide the United States with a real chance to reorient U.S.-Cuban relations and to break free of the ideological blinders that have led to such unbending – and unproductive – Cuba policies. Unchained from an obsession with Fidel, the United States has an opportunity to reframe its relationship with Cuba in a manner that could help facilitate a transition to democratic governance on the island.
Before continuing with the specific role the United States should play in Cuba, however, it is important to note, as American political philosopher and economist Francis Fukuyama argues, that “[u]nless political will can be generated from within the society to overcome (authoritarian) actors, outside pressure is seldom sufficient by itself to dislodge them.” The construction of democratic institutions, therefore, must be a process led by insiders, not outsiders. The Bush administration has overlooked this fact repeatedly and with disastrous results, most glaringly in Iraq, where elections have done little to stem the tide of sectarian violence.
With this in mind, the most important step the United States could take to strengthen the Cuban people’s demand for good governance would be ending the embargo against Cuba – a futile, counterproductive relic of the Cold War. Throughout its history, the blockade – as it is known among Cubans – has played into the hands of the Castro brothers, allowing them to solidify their iron grip on the island. Castro has used the embargo to galvanize public support behind his regime and his policies by portraying the United States as an evil colossus responsible for all of the country’s ills. Castro has then justified quashing dissent by claiming those who are against him are agents of America. As a result, the embargo has not promoted human rights and democracy in Cuba, but has in fact provided the Castro regime with a pretext to crack down on dissent. By ending the embargo, the United States would deny the next Cuban government this pretext for authoritarian practices.
Additionally, the end of the embargo would allow for a free exchange of people and ideas. As Cubans have greater opportunities to interact with Americans, they will see that we are not the enemy and that democracy and the free market have contributed to our free and productive lifestyles. Cubans, in turn, could become less content with their government and place greater pressure on their leaders to carry out productive reforms, such as redefining property rights and opening up the economic and political arenas.
The Bush administration planned miserably for the post-Castro era, believing that the demise of Fidel would lead to the demise of tyranny. Even now, as it becomes evident that a gradual transfer of power from Fidel to Raúl and Castro loyalists is taking place, the administration remains committed to an ineffective, antiquated policy of economic embargo. Nevertheless, the possibility for facilitating productive change on the island does exist, if only the United States would reach out for it and reshape its relationship with Cuba into something less hostile and more flexible.
Andrew Tillman is a graduate student at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.