The U.S. Embargo of Cuba

Cuba’s acting President Raul Castro delivers a speech during a ceremony to mark the 54th anniversary of the Cuban Revolution in Camaguey, Cuba, Thursday, July 26, 2007. Castro told tens of thousands of loyalists that the country suffered a serious blow when his brother Fidel fell ill a year ago, but that the chaos that the U.S. had long predicted never materialized. Below him depictions of Cuban leader Fidel Castro, at right, and Argentine revolutionary leader Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara. (AP Photo/Javier Galeano)

The United States’ current policy toward Cuba is both ineffective and counterproductive. The Bush administration continues to cling to the belief that greater enforcement of travel restrictions, increased anti-Castro broadcasting, and an embargo on trade will bring about democratic reform on the island. If the administration were to objectively examine the effectiveness of the embargo, however, it might finally agree with the European Union’s assessment that constructive engagement would be preferable to coercive measures when it comes to establishing a productive policy toward Cuba.

The History of an Ineffective Embargo

The embargo against Cuba began in 1960 after the new regime of Fidel Castro seized American assets on the island and U.S. officials concluded that Castro was a Soviet puppet intent on spreading communism throughout the Western Hemisphere. The embargo’s primary objectives have at various times included overthrowing Castro, retaliating against the nationalization of U.S. property, containing Cuban communism, and promoting democracy and human rights. But because Castro built a close relationship with the Soviet Union and more recently with Hugo Chavez’s Venezuela, the small island nation has been able to mitigate and circumvent the effects of the embargo.

Castro’s ability to retain power for nearly 50 years and through 10 U.S. presidents reveals that sanctions have not and, most likely, will not achieve the goal of removing him from power. Rather, as numerous examples of tightening the embargo indicate, sanctions have solidified Castro’s control. He has used them to galvanize public support behind his regime and his policies by portraying the United States as an evil colossus responsible for all of the country’s ills. Castro has then justified quashing dissent by claiming those who are against him are agents of America. As a result, the embargo has not promoted human rights and democracy in Cuba, but has in fact provided the Castro regime with a pretext to crack down on dissent.

The Embargo and the National Interest

One damaging aspect of the embargo is that it generates international condemnation of the United States. Every year since 1992 the United Nations has overwhelmingly voted against the embargo, claiming that it violates the Charter of the United Nations, adversely affects the free flow of trade, and infringes upon international law, especially with its extraterritorial provisions.

At the regional level, the embargo damages the relationship between the United States and Latin America. At a time when much of the region feels that the United States is either completely ignoring it or attempting to intervene in its internal affairs, sanctions perpetuate the idea that America has never been a Ògood neighborÓ in the Western Hemisphere.

Furthermore, the embargo contributes to the alienation of America from some of its strongest allies in the European Union. Although the EU, like the United States, encourages Òa process of transition to pluralist democracy and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms,Ó it disagrees with Òcoercive measuresÓ as the best way to bring about such change. The EU especially resents the unlawful extraterritorial nature of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996, which attempts to interfere with foreign countries’ economic relations with Cuba by warning that foreign nationals will be held liable in the United States Òfor trafficking in confiscated property claimed by United States nationalsÓ (Title III, Sec. 302).

Finally the embargo, although it is aimed at bringing down a repressive regime, contributes to the false image of America itself as an inhumane nation, oblivious to the suffering of others. To be sure, Castro’s devastating economic policies and disrespect for human rights are the primary causes of suffering on the island. But U.S. sanctions have harmed the Cuban people by denying them important medicines and medical technology and impeding the export of important foodstuffs.

Why the Embargo Continues to Exist and What Can be Done

Despite the embargo’s numerous drawbacks and the fact that an increasing number of Americans and Cuban Americans believe it should be eased, sanctions are likely to persist through the end of the Castro era because, to a great extent, the embargo, though framed as a foreign policy measure, is an instrument of domestic politics. Both parties use the embargo issue as leverage when competing for the crucial Cuban exile votes in Florida and New Jersey. Despite the fact that the embargo harms the United States by alienating us from our allies in Latin America and Europe, politicians continue to support it because it is politically expedient to so.

For the embargo to end, there most be a fundamental change in the attitude of America’s leaders. American officials must realize that the embargo holds great symbolic significance and that its end—along with an eventual normalization of relations with Cuba—would be an important first step for re-establishing our moral authority in Latin America and beyond. Our leadership must take up the call from our European allies to work on a new Cuba policy that could bring the power of a united Western alliance against the closed Cuban system.

Our government must also recognize that Fidel’s failing health and fading power signifies the end of an era and the beginning of a new one in which we can reach out to more pragmatic Cuban leaders dedicated to both the economic and political opening of the island.

Andrew Tillman is a graduate student at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and is a summer 2007 national security intern at the Center for American Progress.

Further reading:

The following literature was consulted to help develop this crib sheet.

1. Kaplowitz, Donna Rich. Anatomy of a Failed Embargo: U.S. Sanctions against Cuba. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998.

2. Rosenblum, Lilah. “A Time for Change: Rethinking US-Cuba Policy.” Washington, D.C.: Washington Office on Latin America, 2002.

3. Schwab, Peter. Cuba: Confronting the U.S. Embargo. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999.

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