| By jr - Aug 7th, 2007 at 4:43 am EDT |
| Also listed in: Campus Progress Blog |
The unity government of Nouri al-Maliki is effectively dead (at least the "unity" part). Any hopes for political progress should now be changed--it's time to hope the central government doesn't simply collapse.
So, what next?
The draw of the Maliki government was initially its secular nature and its inclusion of Sunnis and Kurds in addition to Shiites. But after losing ministers loyal to Moqtada al-Sadr earlier this year, and losing the Accordance Front's (the largest Sunni party) participation last week, the loss of these five ministers, including the Human Rights Minister, is indicative of Maliki's lack of credibility within the government itself.
We're reliant on this government to find a solution to the unending violence, and it can't even get its ministers to trust it.
I think this illustrates a key question that is receiving little discussion. From a practical standpoint, is a "political solution" a realistic hope at this point? If the goal is the end of violence in Iraq, and the government is incapable of sticking together long enough to even begin implementing serious measures to stem the emnity and violence, is it time to start asking what other measures can be taken to quell the bloodshed?
Nobody wants to have this particular discussion because of what it means for Iraqi civilians, but I think it's long past time we ask this seriously: in the long run, would it potentially be better for the Iraqi people if we, in the short run, simply help Shiite non-governmental militias seize control in the areas where they now operate and pressure Turkey to let the Kurds continue operating autonomously? If the government is incapable of governing, and shows no sign of gaining a monopoly on the use of force, is it worth exploring the option of finding other entity that can potentially create that monopoly and provide ground-level government?
Improving the position of sectarian factions within Iraqi politics may be the easiest way to stem the violence, while setting the stage for what I fear is likely the inevitable partition of Iraq into smaller sectarian states. While the subject of the dissolution of the Iraqi government--the best attempt so far at creating national unity--is depressing as hell, it's time we seriously explored the mechanisms available for achieving that partition with as little violence as possible.
If al-Maliki can't keep his own Cabinet together, perhaps we should be asking why the hell we think he can keep Iraq together.

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